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ABSTRACT

Bourquard, Brian A., M.S., Purdue University, May 2014. An Economic Analysis of Sizing
Constraints: Price Discrimination and Changes in Welfare Under the New York City Soda
Ban. Major Professor: Dr. Steven Wu.

This thesis uses profit maximizing techniques and nonlinear, second-degree price
discrimination theory to describe changes in consumption and gains and losses in
welfare of consumption under a container size constraint. It observationally examines
the New York City soda ban to provide insight into retailer behavior in the event of such
a ban, and examines three cases to highlight potential retailer decisions to compensate
for a ban: to continue using a restricted menu of pricing options; to sell only to high type
soda consumers; or to serve both markets with a one-size-fits-all strategy. This thesis
finds that the ban generally reduces aggregate consumption welfare, without
addressing losses in consumer choice – retailers will profit less, low type consumers will
continue to capture zero or near zero surplus, and high type consumers experience
changes in welfare dependent on the case. In one case they experience a loss of
captured surplus, in one case they experience no change, and in a third case, they
experience an ambiguous change. Soda consumption generally declines in two of the
examined cases. As sweetened beverage consumption is directly linked to obesity,
reduced consumption may lead to lower incidence of associated metabolic disorders.

1

CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION AND RELEVANT LITERATURE

This thesis explores pricing mechanisms in the presence of beverage size constraints,
a form of market intervention, in order to better understand retailer profit-maximizing
behavior. Bans restricting sales by size or quantity effectively reduce producers’ and
retailers’ abilities to engage in nonlinear pricing schemes. This thesis develops a seconddegree price discrimination model to analyze likely outcomes of the ban on price and
quantity combinations and the resulting changes in the welfare of consumption. To
illustrate the model, the thesis uses as an example the New York City Soda Ban (“ban”),
which intended to prohibit food service establishments regulated by the city health
department from selling sugar-sweetened beverages in sizes larger than sixteen ounces.
The ban applied to any establishment (“retailers”) in which individual portions of food
were provided directly to the consumer and which receives a health-grade from the City
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, including fast-food establishments and
restaurants. Not included were supermarkets and convenience stores. The soda ban
was struck-down by the courts in March of 2013, a decision subsequently upheld upon
appeal the following July. The ban is currently under review by the New York State
Supreme Court.
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After exploring the relevant literature, the thesis sets up a standard model of a
profit-maximizing firm facing two types of consumers, low types and high types: low
types

who consume relatively small amounts of soda and, high types

who

consume large amounts of soda. By simplifying the market in such a way, this analysis is
able to focus on retailers’ decisions regarding which consumer type to serve. Currently,
in the absence of government imposed size constraints, retailers serve both consumer
groups. This thesis explores three potential cases under the size constraint: that the
retailer continues to serve both consumer groups through a menu of options; that the
retailer serves both consumer groups through a one-size-fits-all strategy; or, that the
retailer serves only one consumer group with one size. To do this, the thesis sets up the
first order Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the profit maximization function and then explores
profit levels at the various outcomes. The thesis then analyzes the effect of a ban on
economic welfare of retailers and consumers. Each case under the ban is tested against
the unrestricted menu of options currently observed in the market to determine
impacts on the welfare of consumption and retailer profit.
The soda ban was a change in the city’s health policy, which combined with other
changes such as bans of trans-fats and public smoking was intended to lead to greater
social health. Overall, given the many regulatory changes to food and tobacco products
under Mayor Bloomberg, the city may be attempting to induce healthy behavior among
its citizens. As the courts invalidated the law for its method of implementation, it is
possible that it could be reintroduced through the legislative process as opposed to
executive fiat. Soda bans have also been discussed in other cities, such as San Jose,
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California, and it is possible that attempts to restrict or discourage consumption of
sweetened drinks will likely continue.
Interest in public health issues has been growing steadily, and health care played a
critical role in the United States’ 2012 elections. With growing overweight and obesity
problems in the United States and across OECD countries (Triall, 2012), policy makers
have been looking for ways to reduce healthcare costs. For many years, information
campaigns, such as anti-smoking advertisements, played a key role in changing
consumer behavior. Now, many policy makers are seeking more active ways to
discourage unhealthy consumption, including size constraints and taxes.
Concurrently, consumers, retailers, producers, and consumer advocates point out
that individuals should be free to engage in consumption behavior of their own choice.
Many of the arguments against the ban are not predicated on its lack of efficacy or flaws,
but against government intrusion into the lives of consumers. Policy makers, they argue,
are engaging in overly paternalistic behavior resulting in reduced market diversity,
restrictions on business, and reduced freedom of choice.
To explore the ban’s impacts on the welfare of consumption, this thesis uses
traditional profit maximization techniques. It also uses comparative statics to
understand how changes in policy, changes in population, or changes in preferences can
affect price and quantity combinations. This thesis does not address bundling or
substitutions. As only certain classes of establishments are subject to the ban,
consumers could choose to shop at retailers who are unaffected or to substitute
alternative products. To simplify the market, this possibility is not included in this
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analysis. The thesis specifically addresses the concerns of ban opponents and their
claim that consumers are made worse off through a reduction in their freedom to
consume large-sized sodas. It does not quantitatively address health within the context
of the model. Instead, changes in welfare are related specifically to consumption and
retailer profit.
As policy makers continue to explore various mechanisms, economic studies can
help illuminate both the intended and unintended consequences of policy prescriptions.
Health policies restricting or discouraging unhealthy consumption behavior will continue
to play a key role in the foreseeable future and public discussion may be better
informed through a more rigorous, model based approach to understanding changes in
price-quantity combinations, and total welfare. This thesis attempts to add to the
conversation by building on known pricing literature and analyzing changes in the
welfare of consumption.
The analysis relies on traditional price discrimination theory as laid out by Jean
Tirole in his book “The Theory of Industrial Organization” (1988). Tirole lays out the
framework for second-degree price discrimination by first establishing its rough
definition: when a producer (or retailer) sells the same good at different prices to either
the same consumer or different consumers. Tirole points out that the definition is not
all encompassing of potential price discriminations; however, it covers the concept of
price discrimination explored in this thesis, soda being a non-differentiated good being
sold to multiple consumer types at different unit prices and price-quantity combinations.
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Sellers may have some market power to set prices such that they can capture consumer
surplus and must incent consumers to reveal their hidden type.
Much of the work in understanding nonlinear pricing theory can be traced back to
Myerson (1979) who expounds upon information asymmetries and incentive
compatibility pay-offs; Myerson’s work is critical in understanding pricing schemes in
the presence of hidden information. This thesis sets up a model by which consumers
will self-select, and hence reveal their type, based on a menu of options provided by
producers who have no a priori knowledge of the consumer’s type. The work of
Myerson can be traced back to work by Gibbard (1973) who demonstrated manipulation
of outcomes through misrepresentation of preferences.
Hidden information results in agents maximizing their utility in the market by
keeping their type, or willingness to pay, hidden from principals. This adverse selection
problem can be overcome by producers through pricing schemes to create incentive
compatibility – in other words, they will pay an information rent to consumers with
higher willingness to pay in order to entice them to purchase their intended pricequantity combination. Soda retailers’ goal is to sell as much soda as possible at the
highest price possible, and they can sell more soda using a menu of sizes and seconddegree price discrimination, thereby increasing profits over a linear pricing scheme.
Second-degree price discrimination relies on the work of Mussa and Rossen (1978)
who point to the necessity to pay high willingness to pay consumers to purchase their
intended bundle. Mussa and Rossen point out that a monopolist can extract further
profits from the market by reducing the quality of the item being sold to low willingness
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to pay consumers – thus offering them a second best option. By offering a second best
option to low type consumers, the producer can offer high willingness to pay consumers
a quality equal to their first best option. In the case of soda sales, producers reduce the
size of the offering for low type consumers to their second-best option in order to
reduce the information rents to the high type consumers. This creates the conditions
necessary for incentive compatibility – each consumer type will purchase the bundle
intended specifically for them.
Incentive compatibility relies on the revelation principle, as expounded on by
Myerson (1979), Baron and Myerson (1982), and others, which generally states that
when incentive-compatibility is possible (equilibriums exist) principals can design
mechanisms that incent agents to reveal their types. Because consumers given an
opportunity to maximize their own utility will do so in any given situation, producers are
motivated to provide incentives to consumers to purchase their intended price-quantity
combinations. Under conditions of a ban, which does not account for producers’ desires
to maximize profit, producers will arrange the price-quantity combinations to extract as
much of the social welfare as remains. In doing so, the ban may reduce total welfare by
impacting consumer surplus, through reduced soda consumption, and may reduce
retailer surplus through reduced sales. Reduced soda consumption is a possible
outcome of the policy; however, it is important to note that this thesis explores the
welfare of consumption – that is, that retailers and consumers welfare is explicitly tied
to their ability to sell and purchase soda respectively. Consumer welfare is derived
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from their consumption of soda, while retailer welfare is defined as their profits from
the sales of soda.
An important look at the application of setting quantity to maximize profits comes
from Maskin and Riley (1984) who explore monopolist pricing under conditions of
asymmetric information. They confirm that under any situation in which consumers are
required to self-identify, that providing low willingness to pay consumers with a less
than first best option allows the monopolist to provide a first best option to high
willingness to pay consumers. In their analysis, marginal changes in quantity provided
to low type consumers may have near zero impacts on profit, while providing first best
options and maximizing quantities to high willingness to pay consumers has a first-order
impact on profit levels, in order to entice high willingness to pay consumers to purchase
their intended bundle.
Overall, the pricing literature is well suited to analyze the cases presented in this
thesis. The final methodological review is from Kuhn and Tucker (1951) who lay out the
necessary and sufficient conditions to determine maximum values of any given function
and set of constraints. The Kuhn-Tucker method is employed in this thesis to determine
saddle points maximizing the producers’ profit functions subject to an incentive
compatibility constraint, participation constraint, and a size constraint in the case of a
ban.
The literature discussed above provides the framework for the quantitative
analyses presented herein. Together, they comprise the bulk of Tirole’s (1988) work,
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mentioned above, which demonstrates the traditional methodology for analyzing
second-degree price discrimination.
While the pricing literature is well developed, the literature on food bans is sparse.
There are no known papers specifically addressing changes in price-quantity
combinations and welfare changes after an imposed size constraint. In a recent article,
Wilson, Stolarz-Fantino, and Fantino (2013) elaborated on unintended consequences of
limiting sugary drink sizes. Using a behavioral simulation, they offered participants
various drink menus without mentioning the presence of a size ban. In cases in which
participants were offered bundles of smaller soda, the total ounces of which added up
to one large soda, total ounces of soda consumed were greater than when a menu of
sizes were presented. Their paper also examined the New York City soda ban, and
found that it may not result in reduced consumption when retailers or producers are
able to offer a bundle of sodas that add up to the original size. Conversely, the total
purchased ounces of soda may actually increase, giving retailers an incentive to bundle
sodas. The authors even report that revenues could be higher under bundling of smaller
sodas than under a menu of unrestricted options. This may be slightly counter-intuitive,
as producers should be incented to provide this option at present, something not
observed in the market, implying it does not adequately explain the decision to offer
unrestricted menus of price-quantity combinations. It does, however, illuminate the
potential unintended and not fully understood consequences of a sizing constraint.
In an unconstrained market, package size is an important factor in purchase and use
characteristics across many consumer products. Wansink (1996) explored package size
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in relation to usage volumes in branded products. He hypothesizes that larger package
sizes encourage greater usage per usage event, and that a portion of the use is related
to the perceived unit cost of the product. Using four laboratory and one field study,
Wansink concluded that large package sizes result in increased product use, even when
package size is separate from product supply (how full a package is). He also finds that
usage is influenced by perceived unit costs – when unit costs are lower usage per event
increases. For consumers, package size provides inferred information regarding unit
cost – the larger the package the lower the perceived unit costs. For managers,
providing a larger package size or multipack offerings may increase purchases and usage
frequency. From a policy perspective, Wansink addresses the problems of overdosing,
consuming more of something than is healthy due to a desire to reduce waste.
Packaging sodas in larger quantities may encourage exactly this behavior, up to a point.
In other words: larger package sizes increase consumption.
While Wansink addressing consumptive behavior related to package size, Cohen
(2008) examines pricing in the paper towel market using empirical and counter-factual
analyses. He finds that between 34 and 46 percent of price discounts based on quantity
are consistent with price discrimination, while the remaining quantity price discounts
are due to cost savings. Additionally, competition among producers in the multi-roll
market increases consumer surplus, implying consumers benefit from greater pricequantity combinations. Thus, a restriction in price-quantity combinations for consumer
products may result in reduced welfare when starting from an unrestricted status-quo.
Wansink and Cohen demonstrate that package size relates directly to consumption and
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that pricing mechanisms related to package size are designed consistent with seconddegree price discrimination, two conditions necessary for this thesis’s conclusions. In
addition to market constraints, many authors have explored concerns related to
consumer knowledge and taxes and their impacts on consumption.
Zheng, McLaughlin, and Kaiser (2012) found that consumer knowledge regarding
taxes has important impacts on consumption of food and beverages. In cases of sales
tax, which is not listed in the shelf price, increases in tax had no impact on consumption;
on the other hand, increases in excise taxes, which are typically passed onto consumers
and listed in the shelf price, decreased demand in a similar fashion to price changes.
This study is illuminating in its potential treatment of “fat taxes,” imposed to reduce
consumption of products that have negative health impacts.
The potential for taxes to reduce consumption of unhealthy products was also
explored in conjunction with their regressive nature on the poor. Madden (2013) finds
that taxes on unhealthy food and beverage products have a greater impact on the poor,
a population group with a greater concentration of obesity. Madden does not discuss
the potential substitutions that occur or the impact on consumer health under a ‘fat-tax’
regime. He also avoids the issue of whether or not rising obesity levels indicate a
market failure that demands government intervention.
Substitutions, which are not addressed in this thesis, are important in their
potential consequences for health policy. Miao et al. (2013) find that when substitution
within food groups is not accounted for in taxes on high-sugar, high-fat food products,
that the impact on consumption patterns is understated and the welfare loss is
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overstated. Consumers may substitute alternative items or shop at unaffected retailers
for those being taxed, implying that there is little change in overall calorie consumption.
The New York City soda ban constrains size only for items purchased through specific
distribution channels: retailers subject to health grading by the City’s Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene. As consumers have an alternative to purchase soda
elsewhere, this raises some concerns about the efficacy of the policy in fighting obesity.
In a qualitative approach, Loewenstein, Brennan, and Volpp (2007) develop
concepts of Asymmetric Paternalism, the idea that various activities, such as purchasing
food, can be designed in such a way so as to encourage healthy behaviors. They do not
advocate bans or explicit enforcement mechanisms, but instead rely on environmental
design to reinforce healthy behaviors, such as putting healthy foods first in a lunch line
or replacing large sodas with water or juice as the default option in fast food menus.
They do not present evidence to indicate the efficacy of such solutions, but they
progress the discussion by addressing it from an alternative angle that does not demand
restrictions on “freedom” of choice enjoyed by consumers and retailers. Alternatively,
some researchers find that retailers may induce suboptimal social outcomes through
their practice of super-sizing.
Dobson and Gerstner (2010) demonstrate the use of super-sizing portions and
pricing incentive systems to encourage consumers to purchase larger portions, and
hence to overeat. They show that producers and retailers profit handsomely from this
practice. They also posit that the practice erodes social welfare as the costs required to
provide the enlarged portions can exceed the consumers’ willingness to pay. Given this,
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they advocate finding ways to discourage the practice of extra-large portioning and
encourage consumers to choose smaller portions. While their paper is interesting, it
reads as if written from an ideological perspective, without appropriate academic
detachment. Another perspective for reducing unhealthy consumption is through
consumer education – specifically labeling. The technique was used with some success
in the cigarette market, although less work has been done to assess its efficacy in food
and drink markets.
Lusk and Marette (2010) use multiple techniques to estimate consumers’
willingness to pay in the presence of labels and food-bans. They use livestock cloning
and methyl-mercury in fish in their studies, but demonstrate the varying magnitude of
results depending on the empirical application chosen, although the sign of the change
is consistent across their studies. While this thesis is not empirical, the Lusk and
Marette study demonstrates the potential challenges in understanding the magnitude
of the impact of a soda ban, even when we can understand the direction of the change.
This indicates the complexity of assessing how consumers respond to food and drink
information and bans, particularly in relation to health.
Obesity, due to its associated health conditions, often demands attention from
policy makers, intent on finding solutions. In developed nations, the problems are
particularly prominent, while developing nations continue to see increasing obesity as a
negative health outcome. Faulkner et al. (2011) used a Delphi survey of experts and a
systematic literature review and found consistent evidence that weight is responsive to
food and beverage prices, supporting the use of a tax on sugar sweetened beverages;
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however, they note that independently of other actions, a tax may not be highly
effective. Instead, a tax may be more efficacious when coupled with subsidies for
healthy foods and a review of agricultural policies encouraged at providing healthy food
options. Regardless of healthier alternatives, there is a strong link between diet, obesity,
and injurious metabolic syndromes.
Significant research has been devoted to the relationship between obesity and
chronic health conditions. Several researchers elucidate the connection, including
Lustig (2010), who posits the parallels between fructose and alcohol addictions and their
negative consequences on health, including the inducement of metabolic diseases. He
concludes that, analogous to ethanol (alcohol), social efforts to reduce fructose
consumption will be required in order to combat rising obesity. Higher consumption
levels of sugar invariably lead to a greater incidence of metabolic diseases across a
population. This conclusion is supported by Luc et al. (2010) who present a large body
of evidence that a high-fructose diet is causal to obesity, diabetes, and dyslipidemia in
laboratory animals. Their paper concludes that consumption of sweetened beverages is
directly associated with excess calorie intake, an increased risk of diabetes, and
increased cardiovascular diseases through an increase in body weight. They
recommend limiting the daily intake of sugar-based calories. As the majority of fructose
in human diets is derived from sweetened beverages, there is a direct correlation
between soda consumption and obesity.
Policies that address obesity levels are being discussed at greater length and new
efforts continue to push policy makers to find solutions. Interventions, such as those
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discussed by Philipson and Posner (2008) in their paper discussing the central themes of
a decade of obesity research, may or may not be efficacious, but continue to be
implemented or discussed by various local governments around the United States.
Taxes, bans, and regulations may increase going forward, particularly given the ongoing
discussions regarding health costs and outcomes. This thesis’s contribution is to
determine the impacts on the welfare of consumption related to the soda ban, and
provide a qualitative analysis of the model’s quantitative outcomes.
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CHAPTER 2.

THE MODEL

In any pricing scheme, a principal makes pricing decisions based on relevant market
factors, starting with their abilities to discriminate between consumers and consumers’
abilities to arbitrage. For the context of this model, the soda market consists of retailers
subject to health grades by the New York City of Health and Mental Hygiene; this
includes food-service establishments such as restaurants, street-vendors, bowling alleys,
and fast-food operations. It does not include supermarkets and convenience-stores
such as 7-Eleven. In the case of the soda market, retailers may maintain some market
power over price through moderate product differentiation, primarily taste, branding,
and convenience, such as location. Premium brand products sell for higher prices than
store-brands or off-brand products, and location attributes, such as the proximity of
competition, contribute to retailers’ abilities to price products. However, to make
pricing more challenging, there are few transaction costs or barriers to arbitrage
between consumers, although a secondary market in soda is unlikely to develop. More
importantly, retailers are incapable of identifying the consumer’s type, meaning they
need to develop a pricing scheme that incents consumers to self-identify by purchasing
the soda size and price combination intended for them. At the same time, the retailer is
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a rational profit maximizer, and thus wants to extract as much surplus from consumers
as possible.
To create the model, assume there are two types of consumers in the soda market:
those who consume large amounts of soda, denoted as θH, and those who consume
relatively smaller amounts of soda, denoted θL, The θH type consumer has a high
willingness to pay and a correspondingly high elasticity, while the θL consumers have a
lower willingness to pay and lower elasticity. Ideally, the retailer would like to engage in
first-degree price discrimination, in which the retailer charges each consumer their
reservation price for soda; however, he cannot observe the consumer’s type or prevent
arbitrage between consumers. The retailer will therefore use second degree price
discrimination to incent consumers to reveal their preferences through self-selection. In
other words, the consumer will choose a price/quantity bundle that maximizes her own
utility.
To determine the effects of a size ban, a traditional two-type nonlinear pricing
model is used to maximize the retailers’ profits. Each consumer has a utility function:
U(i, q) = θiqi – pi, where i denotes either a high consumer, H, or low consumer, L, p i is the
price each pays, qi is the quantity, and θi is a parameter indicating the consumer’s type.
In all cases, θH > θL, in other words, the high type consumers always want to
consume more soda than low type consumers. This condition satisfies the single
crossing property, implying monotonicity of the utility functions such that U(θ H, q) –
U(θL, q) is increasing in q. Assuming the utility function is differentiable, then the single
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crossing property implies that

. A final, and important, assumption is

the retailer’s cost function, c(q), is such that c’(q) > 0 and c’’(q) >0 meaning that cost is
increasing and convex.

2.1

Without The Ban

Using the assumptions above, a profit maximization equation can be used to
establish the optimal price-quantity combination in an unrestricted market, meaning
before any ban is in place. Taking the two-type profit maximization model from the
literature and applying it here requires assigning the probability of encountering the
consumer types; thus, θL consumers occur in proportion β and θH consumers occur in
the corresponding proportion (1-β), such that if a consumer is not θL then they are by
definition θH. β is thus the probability of encountering a low type consumer and
represents the percentage of the population denoted by θL.
Given the assumption above, the retailer’s profit maximization equation is:
(1.1)

MAXp,q

[

]

[

] s.t.

(P.C.)
(I.C.)
Equation 1.1 is the profit equation of the retailer subject to the participation constraint
for the low type consumers and the incentive compatibility constraint for the high type
consumers. It is clear and well established in the literature (Tirole 1988) that as long as
the low types participate (are either indifferent or have positive utility from their
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purchase decision) then the high types will also participate, implying that the low type
participation constraint is binding. Additionally, the literature establishes that the high
type consumer’s incentive compatibility is binding because low types would receive
negative utility from consumption of the high type bundle; therefore, the incentive
compatibility constraint states that the high types must get greater utility from
purchasing their bundle, making this the binding constraint.
Letting these constraints hold with equality and solving them for price (p i) results
in
(P.C.)
and
(I.C.)
Substituting these expressions into the objective function results in
(1.2)

MAXqi [

]

[

]

which expresses price in terms of utility and allows for analysis of the problem using
unconstrained optimization. The first order Kuhn-Tucker Conditions are
[

(1.3)
where

]
and

,

and
(1.4)

[
where

]
and

[

]
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Given this set-up, there are two cases worthy of further exploration: case I, in which the
retailer serves both types of consumers; and, case II, in which the retailer serves only
high type consumers and stops serving low type consumers.

2.1.1 Case I
In the first case of interest, the retailer serves both types of consumers, implying
that qH > 0 and qL > 0. Under this condition, the first order conditions (1.3) and (1.4)
hold with equality, thus
(1.5)

and,

(1.6)
Thus, the retailer should choose to set the high type size equal to their first best amount,
at which their marginal cost is equal to their marginal utility, and set the low types
amount to be less than their optimal consumption quantity. Equation (1.6)
demonstrates that the cost of serving the low type consumers is increased by an
amount equal to the information rent,

, required to serve the high types

and maintain incentive compatibility. The information rent, as shall be demonstrated, is
a cost the retailer must pay to the high type consumers in order for them to purchase
their own price/quantity bundle and not the bundle intended for the low types.
Using equations (1.5) and (1.6) and the participation and incentive compatibility
constraints, the optimal quantities can be derived for both types of consumers
(1.7)
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and
(1.8)
where

denotes the optimal quantity for each type, such that

if first-

degree price discrimination were possible. Thus the low type consumers are left with no
surplus as the retailer extracts it in its entirety. Alternatively, the high type consumer’s
price is discounted by the information rent, leaving them with positive net surplus. This
surplus is left to them in order to maintain incentive compatibility, as without it the high
types could always purchase the bundle intended for low types and receive positive
utility. As a side note, this implies that

, in other words, the

information rent must be greater than the utility high types would receive from
purchasing the low types’ bundle.
These equations also imply that changes in exogenous parameters,
will result in changes to the optimal prices and quantities,
. Increases in
(because

will result in increases in

); and, increases in

and an increase in

will result in a decrease in

parameters constant) and increases in both

(holding other

(again, holding other parameters

constant). In other words, the more heterogeneous the population of consumers
becomes, the more the retailer will lower

. As the population becomes more

homogenous, the information rent required to get

consumers to purchase the

bundle intended for them increases. Additionally, an increase in the parameter
result in an increase in

will

. If the likelihood of encountering a low type consumer

increases, the retailer wants to incent them to purchase more, even at the expense of
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greater information rents. Conversely, a decrease in

will result in a decrease in

in

order to reduce the information rents required to maintain incentive compatibility with
the high type consumers.
This theoretical result is consistent with observed pricing behavior by retailers.
Soda comes in a variety of sizes intended to satisfy the demands of multiple types of
consumers – from small containers of 222 milliliters up to large containers of 2000
milliliters. Observationally, smaller sizes have become more prevalent in the market,
indicating a strengthened preference for smaller soda sizes. This change is represented
in the model by an increase in

, accompanied by a decrease in

. Large sizes are

also present in the market, such as McDonald’s supersized soda, indicating a strong
preference by some consumers for large soda sizes. Increases in this preference,
represented in the model by increases in

, leads to increases in

.

2.1.2 Case II
In the second case of interest, the retailer serves only the high type consumers,
thus: qH > 0 and qL = 0. This case allows the retailer to optimize price and quantity to
provide the high groups with a first best choice. It works when

is small enough (there

are few low type consumers in the market). As mentioned previously, the information
rent increases the more homogenous the market becomes; there will thus be a
boundary at which the profits from the low type consumers are too small to justify
paying an information rent to high type consumers:
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[

]

[

], at which point

becomes zero. In this

case, the first order Kuhn-Tucker Conditions are
(1.9)
and
(1.10)
In this case, 1.10 demonstrates that qL is effectively zero because at any point the
retailer would lose money serving the low type consumers. Because there is no
information rent required to induce high types to purchase their bundle, it also implies
(1.11)
Because the retailer owes no information rent to high types, she can raise the price pH
relative to the equilibrium in which both markets were served. Any small changes in
will only impact the high types price (pH) and quantity (clearly qL cannot get smaller than
zero). Alternatively, marginal changes in

or

will have no impact on prices or

quantities until the changes are large enough to cause a switch back to Case I – in other
words, at the point at which profits from serving low type consumers outweigh the
required information rents.

2.2

With The Ban

There is increasingly a push by government actors to limit negative behavior by
consumers. The New York City soda ban by Mayor Bloomberg is one such example, and
it is not alone. Other municipalities, none of them as large as New York City, have tried
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to implement various constraints beyond taxation. The New York City ban limits the
sale of sizes greater than sixteen ounces by any retailer subject to health inspections.
To compare this to the outcomes of unconstrained sales, the original profit equation is
modified to include an additional size constraint
(1.12)

[

MAXp,q

]

[

] s.t.

(P.C.)
(I.C.)
(Size Constraint)
In which

represents the maximum size permitted by regulation. In this case, it

should be assumed that

is smaller than

in order to make the constraint binding.

Clearly, were it larger than the preferred soda size of high type consumers, it would
have no impact on price and quantity combinations, and the results would be the same
as in in the unrestricted cases above.
The new constraint can be added to the original problem (1.2) to yield
(1.13)

MAXqi [

]

[

] s.t.

And the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions are
(1.14)

where

and
(1.15)

[
where

]
and

[

]
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In the presence of a size constraint, or soda ban, the retailer has four choices: to stop
serving any consumer group, or shut-down, a choice we can discard given that positive
profits are still available; to serve both consumer types through multiple sizes
conformed to meet the size regulations; to serve only the high type consumers, making
; or, to serve both consumer types using a one-size-fits-all strategy. Each of these
final three strategies will be examined in greater detail. It is possible that the ban
induces a change in regime such that the retailer may switch from serving both
consumer types with a menu of options (Case A) to serving only high-type consumers
(Case B) or a one-size fits all strategy (Case C). This possibility and its conditions are
discussed in Chapter 5.

2.2.1 Case A
In the first scenario, the retailer decides to serve both consumer types through a
menu of drinks. This case is analogous to Case I above, except in its incorporation of the
ban. In this scenario,

, and equation (1.14) is non-binding and strictly

positive. Equation (1.15) holds with equality such that

satisfies the equation

from Case I above.
This implies that under a ban, if a retailer chooses to provide multiple sizes in order
to serve the same two consumer groups
a.

will be unaffected by the ban,

b.

will be unaffected by the ban,
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c.

will decrease to

, implying a decline in the quantity sold to

d.

will commensurately decrease from

types, and,
to

.

2.2.2 Case B
In this case, the retailer decides to serve only
II above. As in Case II,

, however, neither equation (1.14) nor equation (1.15)

hold with strict equality, and
profits from the
paid to

type consumers, similar to Case

. In this scenario, the retailer has decided that

type consumers are less than the required information rent being

type consumers.
Intuitively, if

has dropped to

, then the price paid by

consumers will fall

from
to
This situation may occur when

is small or the information rent is large.

2.2.3 Case C
This final case demonstrates a possible outcome under the ban that is not a
profit maximizing retailer choice in an unrestricted market. Suppose the ban is of the
form

, but

, and the retailer chooses to serve both markets using a one-

size-fits-all strategy. This would occur if
to

were sufficiently small so as to be very close

. In other words, the ban would have to be extremely restrictive.
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To find the optimal price and quantity, the retailer would solve
(1.16)

MAX

Because

types will always purchase as long as

types purchase, their participation

constraint is not binding, and thus not included. Because the retailer wants to capture
the entire available consumer surplus, the participation constraint is binding, holding
with equality. Substituting the constraint into the profit function leads to the new
maximization equation
(1.17)

MAX

and the first order condition
(1.18)
The first order condition indicates that the retailer will make the one-size-fits-all
container to match the first best choice for the
constraint yields the optimal price of
quantity combination will be sold to both high

type consumers. The participation
. Despite the subscripts L, the price and
and low

types of consumers. The

subscript indicates that the price quantity combination happens to also be the first best
options for the low type consumer. Under this pricing scheme, the ban is not binding
because

.

As mentioned above, this circumstance is very unlikely in the absence of a size
constraint. Again, a trip to a retailer will confirm this: there are many sizes available. It
must be true, therefore, that retailers find greater profit in segmenting the market and
serving many types as opposed to grouping the types together. Regardless, under a
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strictly binding and low enough ban, this could be an optimal choice. This is further
explored in the welfare and profit analyses below.

2.3

Pricing Strategy And Profits

Previously, the thesis has explored two potential price strategies without a ban
and three strategies with a ban in place. In both scenarios, a retailer could choose to
serve both consumer types with a menu of options or serve only high type consumers.
Additionally, if a ban is in place, a retailer could choose to serve both consumer types
with a single size.
It is easy to see what retailers choose to do in an unregulated situation by going to
a local food-service establishment where many sizes are available for consumption. To
determine what retailers would do under a ban requires analyzing their profits.
Because it is known that retailers currently offer a menu of options to serve
multiple consumer types, it poses the question: would a retailer continue this strategy
under a ban or would the ban incent them to switch to a different price strategy? Each
case has a profit expression to help answer this
[

(1.19)

]
[

(1.20)

(

and
(1.21)

[

[

]

)]

(

)]
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In Case A the retailer continues to serve both consumer types using a menu of options
that conform to the ban. It was shown that
limits only

; however,

and therefore

and

are unaffected by a ban which

will decrease. Therefore, the retailer will

switch strategies if and only if:
[

(1.22)

(
(

[

)]

]

[

)]

which reduces to
(1.23)

[

]

[

]

This clearly indicates that a retailer will switch strategies from a menu of options to
serving only high types if and only if the profits from serving the low type consumers
(the left hand side of the expression) are less than the information rents required to
incent the high types to purchase their bundle (the right hand side of the expression). It
is noteworthy that the equation (1.23) does not rely on

, indicating that this choice is

independent of the ban as long as the constraint does not impact
retailer decision then is based on the size of
As

and

. The

and the heterogeneity of the population.

increases the profits from low type consumers increase and the retailer is more

likely to serve them through a menu of options.
As noted previously, it can be casually observed that the profit from serving low
type consumers is greater than the information rents paid to high type consumers.
In the event of a ban, retailers also face the choice of switching from Cases A or B,
menu pricing, as observed in the current retail market, or single market pricing, to Case
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C, serving both consumer types with a one-size-fits-all strategy. Again, the answer
depends on profit levels
(1.24)
Using equations (1.19), (1.20), and (1.21) above, the expression becomes
(1.25)

[

]
(

[
)]

]
[

[
(

)]

In this situation, the ban works through the right hand side of the equation. As the ban
becomes more binding, placing downward pressure on

, the right hand side becomes

smaller making the transition to Case C more likely.
It is interesting to note that while most establishments do not use the one-sizefits-all price strategy, there is an industry using something similar. Many full service
restaurants have only one size of soft drink available to seated patrons, for which they
charge the optimal amount. In most of these cases, the drink comes with unlimited free
refills. This is a one-size-fits-all pricing strategy by which low type consumers consume
less and high type consumers consume more, although both pay the same price and
have the option of consuming their optimal amount. It is questionable whether this is
profit maximizing for the retailer or is in fact a bundling choice knowing that patrons will
also be ordering food items.
If the ban were binding such that it pushed

and

too close together, more

establishments would likely adopt this type of pricing strategy.
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2.4

Welfare Impacts

To analyze changes in welfare, this thesis starts with the unregulated (no ban)
Case I, in which retailers choose to segment the market and serve both consumer types
with their own bundle. This choice is clear: it is observable that this is the primary
pricing strategy retailers currently employ in the market. Therefore, the ban will induce
them to select one of three possible strategies: continue segmenting the market; serve
only high types; or, serve both types with a one-size-fits-all pricing strategy. This section
analyzes the welfare effects on retailers and consumers for all three potential outcomes.
In Case A the retailer chooses to continue using a market segmentation strategy.
As noted above, the profit expression (1.2) represents the case in which the retailer is
unrestricted and (1.19) the case in which a ban is present
(1.2)

[

]

[

(1.19)

[

]

[

The notable difference in the equation is the decrease of
price paid by
the

]
(
to

, implying that the

type consumers has also dropped. As there is no change in profits from

type consumers, the retailer loses profits from high types and experiences an

unequivocal drop in welfare under the ban, demonstrated by the expression
(

(1.26)
which reduces to
(1.27)

)]

{

(

)}

)
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The left hand side of the equation is strictly less than the right hand side under a strictly
binding ban, indicating a loss of welfare for retailers.
Consumer welfare, defined previously as U(i, q) = θiqi – pi, does not change for
low type consumers who are still offered the same price/quantity combination.
According to the incentive compatibility constraint, the retailer is able to capture the
entire consumer surplus of the low types; therefore, they are no worse or better off
under the ban. The following expressions demonstrate changes for the high type
consumers
(1.28)

where

Therefore, utility for high types is equal to
(1.29)

[

]

which reduces to
(1.30)
which is equal to the information rent obtained by high type consumers. As the
information rent is not dependent on

, high type consumers experience no aggregate

change in welfare. In other words, they still capture the same information rent as
surplus as they did before the ban. In this case, all of the welfare losses are born by the
retailer who is forced to accept smaller quantities at a lower price for one of the market
segments.
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In Case B the retailer decides to serve only the high type consumers in the
market, implying

and

. In this case, the retailer’s profit is described by

expression (1.20)
[

(1.20)

(

)]

The question is, how does this change from the unrestricted profit
(1.2)

[

]

The answer depends on the size of . As
decreases. At a point,

[

]?

gets smaller the profit from the low group

will become small enough that the retailer will decide to serve

only high types and eliminate the information rent payment. In the current market,
where it is known that
types,

is large enough to justify the information rent paid to high

is likely less than

, otherwise retailers would already have adopted this

strategy. It is clear then that retailers would suffer a welfare loss.
Low type consumers were originally given zero surplus as the retailer would
extract all of it as profit. Therefore, a retailer decision not to serve them would have no
effect on low type’s surplus. In practice it is likely that retailers would choose to leave
low type consumers some very small amount of surplus in order to incent them to
purchase as opposed to leaving them indifferent. In this case, it may be that low type
consumers suffer a very marginal amount of welfare loss.
High type consumers on the other hand experience an unequivocal reduction in
welfare. Their original welfare from expression (1.30) was
(1.30)
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However, because the retailer would no longer pay them the information rent, the price
paid by high type consumers would extract all of their welfare
(1.32)

and
(

(1.33)

)

Therefore, high type consumers are made unequivocally worse off under the new
pricing scheme by an amount equal to the information rent,

, which they

were once paid in order to incent them to purchase their intended bundle.
Finally, in Case C the retailer chooses to serve both consumer groups with a onesize-fits-all pricing strategy. As already stated, the retailer received profit

(1.2) under

their current pricing strategy. Expression (1.21) gives the profit under the one-size-fitsall strategy
(1.21)

[

]

If the retailer chose this pricing strategy, it could be said that

was large enough that

the retailer wants to serve both consumer types, therefore
(1.34)

[

]

[

(

)]

The only way in which
(1.35)

[

]

[

]

[

]
is if

is sufficiently large that the retailer wants to give low type consumers their first

best option, increasing profits from low type consumers. If the increase in profits from
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low types outweighs the drop in profits from high type consumers minus the no longer
needed information rents, then retailers will see a gain in welfare.
Observationally, it is unlikely this is the case, that retailers would find it more
profitable to generally serve both consumer types with one size. However, as previously
noted, there are some circumstances under which retailers serve drinks in exactly this
fashion, namely, full service restaurants.
Low type consumers would receive their first best option where
(1.36)

and

Implying that low type consumers again receive zero surplus resulting in no change in
welfare.
High type consumers would be left with some welfare
(1.37)
because the participation constraint is not binding
(1.38)
Whether or not they are better off depends on the size of the surplus they get from
purchasing the low types’ first best option versus the size of the information rent paid
under the no ban situation.
(1.39)
If the left hand side is larger than the right hand side, the high type consumers would be
better off under the one-size-fits-all pricing strategy.
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In every case the low type consumers experience no change as the retailer
appropriates their entire surplus. In almost every case the retailer and high type
consumers experience reduced welfare under the ban: the retailer through losses in
revenues and the high type consumer through losses of the information rent. Many of
the solutions depend on

being sufficiently large or the population being sufficiently

heterogeneous that the retailer has an incentive to continue serving the low type
consumers. Under the current, casually observable population parameters, in which the
retailer has an incentive to serve low type consumers, the retailer is unlikely to be made
better off under any ban situation.
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CHAPTER 3.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

This thesis first examined two potential cases, Case I and Case II, in an unregulated
market: retailers would serve both consumer types with a menu of options; or, retailers
would serve only high type consumers. A casual observation clearly indicates that
producers and retailers generally use Case I, to serve all consumer types with a menu of
options. This provides the underlying insight that it is profit maximizing to do so, rather
than to focus on one consumer segment. The thesis then examined three possible cases,
Cases A, B, and C, in a size constrained market, respectively: to continue serving
consumers with a menu of options; to serve only high type consumers with one size; or,
to serve both consumer types with a one-size-fits-all strategy. A fourth option, to
shutdown, was discarded based on the presence of available profits even after a ban.
Using comparative statics, the thesis determined how changes in exogenous variables
would lead to changes in the pricing scheme. Following the cases was a welfare analysis
comparing each of the three ban cases to the current market conditions: unrestricted
menu pricing.
There are three exogenous variables that impact the price-quantity decision by
retailers:

,

and . In case A, the retailer continues to offer the menu of choices

and experiences a drop in profits as

falls to

after

falls to

. In a switch from
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Case I, the unrestricted menu, to Case A, the restricted menu, the retailer unequivocally
experiences a drop in profits. Low type consumers experience no change in welfare, as
the retailer will continue to capture their surplus; high type consumers will also
experience no change in welfare, as the information rent paid to them is not dependent
on the constraint. In this case, the reduction in welfare is born entirely by the retailer.
The decision to switch from Case A to Case B or C under the ban relies on their
respective profit levels. If the retailer decides to continue offering a menu of choices
after the ban, it is because

. Profit levels are determined by the size

of , the proportion of low type consumers in the market, and the heterogeneity of the
population. The larger

is the more the retailer is willing to pay the information rents

to serve both consumer types with a menu of sizes. If a decrease in

creates a

situation in which profit from low type consumers is less than the information rents paid
to the high types, the retailer will switch to a strategy of serving only the high type
consumers. In this case, the retailer will certainly generate smaller profits than an
unrestricted menu of options would provide, illustrated by Case I; however, they would
generate greater profits than a restricted menu of options, illustrated by Case A.
Additionally, while low type consumers would experience no change in welfare, high
type consumers would experience a loss of welfare as retailers moved to capture the
entire consumer surplus.
Retailers could also make a decision to serve all consumer groups through a onesize-fits-all price strategy. In this case, retailers are certainly worse off than the
unrestricted menu of options, Case I. To determine if they are better off selecting this
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option over Cases A and B requires understanding their profit levels: in this case,
. It can be observationally noted that retailers do not necessarily
find this the most profitable case in an unrestricted market, implying they would suffer a
decline in welfare in a shift from Case I to Case C. Determining if they would use the
one-size-fits-all strategy in the restricted market requires knowing the strength of the
ban. If the ban is sufficiently close to

(in other words, if

retailer finds it profitable to serve both groups, implying

is small), and the
, then the retailer will

opt to provide a first best option to low type consumers and to commensurately charge
them their entire surplus. This leaves low type consumers with no change in welfare as
the retailer is able to confiscate it in its entirety. High type consumers, on the other
hand, may experience a decrease or an increase in welfare depending on the original
size of the information rent and the welfare they receive purchasing a smaller option at
the low types’ price. If

is true, then high types are better

off; alternatively, if it is not true, then they are worse off. In an unrestricted market,
offering low types their first best options would require offering high types a larger
information rent to maintain incentive compatibility. It is likely then that aggregate
welfare declines in a switch from Case I to Case C as retailers lose profit, low types
experience no change, and high types remain ambiguous.
There are unambiguous declines in welfare for retailers, who lose profit, and in
some cases for consumers. The only case of a potential gain in welfare for any group of
actors is under Case C, in which high consumer types may experience a gain if and only if
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they keep more of their consumer surplus by purchasing the low type bundle at the low
type price than the information rent they keep under Case I. Therefore, consumers and
retailers are more likely to experience aggregate declines in welfare in almost any case.
This is driven by retailer losses in profit and overall consumer reductions in welfare.
Low type consumers are unlikely to experience any changes in welfare as they can still
purchase the bundles offered to them and will pay all of their welfare to do so –
meaning they will continue to appropriate zero or near zero levels of surplus.
In Cases A and C, both consumer types continue to purchase soda. It is possible
in Case A that less soda is purchased overall; while low-type prices do not change, hightype prices and quantities decline, indicating reduced consumption. In Case C, the
change in total soda consumption is ambiguous as low-type consumers may consume
more by receiving their first-best size option, while high-type consumers may consume
less as they are receiving a less-than optimal amount of soda. In Case B, low type
consumers are excluded from the market, indicating a reduction in total soda purchases.
Two of the cases presented unambiguously indicate that consumption will fall under a
ban. Given the evidence of a link between sweetened beverages and obesity (Luc 2010),
reduced consumption would indicate an improvement in health outcomes. If a ban
reduced total soda consumption, and thereby decreased spending on diet and obesity
related diseases, it would essentially act as a transfer of welfare from soda retailers to
the larger society, which may pay less for healthcare and experience improved levels of
health.
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This thesis can conclude that retailers will likely suffer reductions in profit under
a ban. It can also conclude that low-type consumers’ consumption welfare will be left
unaffected; however, their consumption could remain the same (Case A), decrease
(Case B), or increase (Case C), indicating ambiguous health outcomes through reduced
consumption. Finally, the thesis can conclude that high type consumers will experience
either no change in consumption welfare with reduced consumption (Case A), reduced
consumption welfare with reduced consumption (Case B), or ambiguous changes in
consumption welfare with reduced consumption (Case C). In many of the cases,
therefore, the total quantity of soda consumed is reduced (Case C remains ambiguous).
Given the strong link between the consumption of sweetened beverages and obesity, if
aggregate consumption of soda declines, it is likely that health would improve through
reduced incidence of obesity and its accompanying metabolic disorders. Additionally, in
only one case is it clear that the ban negatively impacts consumer’s welfare of
consumption (high type consumers in Case B). Therefore, the argument made by many
of the ban’s opponents, claiming reduced consumption welfare, is only true under one
potential scenario. In the most likely post-ban scenario, Case A, consumption welfare
would be unchanged. In general, the welfare of consumption is not made worse off
under a ban.
Future research should look to determine potential healthcare cost reductions or
societal gains from bans, something this thesis does not claim to quantitatively study.
Additionally, further research is necessary to determine if tax policy can be used to
greater effect than bans through a direct comparison of the two. While this thesis
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explores the welfare of consumption, it excludes analyzing substitution effects, which
may lead consumers to substitute equally unhealthy behaviors for soda consumption,
negating the intended health outcomes of a ban. Alternatively, consumers could find
perfect substitutes at alternative locations unaffected by the ban. Finally, future
modeling could incorporate a parameter indicating a “love of diversity,” such that
consumers gain utility from being offered choices. In not including such a parameter,
this thesis excludes the possibility that consumers receive utility from their freedom of
choice.
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